the United States (US), few countries (21 out of 71) have data breach notification laws. Principal component analysis reveals that the six characteristics can be grouped in two unobserved factors, which explain 'basic characteristics' across laws and 'add-ons' to these characteristics. By combining these two factors a privacy index is constructed. Moreover, countries that are not known for their stringent privacy control such as Mauritius and Mexico occupy a top position in this index. Member States of the European Union have DPLs with a privacy control score above average but hold no absolute top position. It is hoped that these findings will open avenues for new research, such as adding more characteristics to the database and further quantification of (internet) law.
Abstract:
This paper presents a pioneering study that unlocks six characteristics in the literal text of 71 Data Protection Laws (DPLs). The characteristics are: the type of collection requirements; the presence of data protection authorities; data protection officers; data breach notification laws; monetary-; and criminal penalties. The quantification allows comparison of data protection laws with each other, such as a potential federal U.S. DPL with European DPLs. It can also be used for empirical legal research in information security by linking the data to other variables, for instance, deep packet inspection. There are some noteworthy initial results: only 5 out of 71 DPLs have penalties for non-compliance that exceed 1 million euro. Moreover, compared to A. Introduction curious whether the perception of privacy control by individuals matches actual stringency in the law such as the height of penalties. Moreover, policy organizations that try to map different aspects of Internet governance and regulation are potentially assisted by an overview of privacy control in DPLs.
1 Legal scholars and practitioners can benefit because the privacy control index gives them a quick overview of privacy control in different countries. The following insights were obtained:
• Only 5 out of 71 countries have a maximum penalty for non-compliance above 1 million euro. Although the threshold of 1 million euro is obviously arbitrary, penalties (far) below this amount possibly have a limited deterrent effect on non-compliance with the law, especially when considering the low likelihood of detection. Hence, it seems that most DPLs have a limited deterrent effect.
• Only 21 out of 71 countries have an obligation to notify data breaches, while in the US, 47 out of 50 states have such a Data Breach Notification Law.
• Approximately half the DPLs I analyzed have criminalized non-compliance with the DPL.
• Two unobservable factors explain variance within two sets of characteristics; I call these 'basic characteristics' and 'add-ons'.
• There are some unusual suspects in the top of the privacy index (the sum of the individual characteristics), such as Mauritius, Mexico and South Africa.
3 This introduction first addresses developments of DPLs in the US and the rest of the world. Hereafter, the law and economics of DPLs are introduced briefly. Next, the limitations of this study are addressed.
I. Developments in Data Protection
Laws in the U.S. and the world 4 Recently, there has been a significant amount of attention on US data protection standards by legislators, organizations and privacy advocates. On June 1 2015, the United States congress allowed crucial parts of the US Patriot act expire. One of the key elements of the Patriot act -the extensive powers of the National Security Agency to collect personal data on a large scale -was terminated. On June 8 2015, the G7 discussed the implementation of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) at their annual conference in Bavaria, Germany. The differences in data protection law between the European Union (EU) and US was a central topic at this conference. According to experts, the risk of infringement of EU data protection standards by US companies could hinder the entry into force of TTIP. 2 Companies in the US have different data protection standards because of differences in data protection regulation between the EU and U.S. For instance, on October 6 2015, the European Court of Justice declared the US safe harbor regulation, which enables free flow of data between the US and EU invalid because of the existence of different data protection standards. 3 Also outside the EU, DPLs are becoming ubiquitous. By September 2013, 101 countries had implemented a data protection law. 4 In addition to that, in 2013, more than 20 privacy regulations were under consideration by other governments. Thus, commercial use of personal information benefits organizations. 7 On the other hand, this data collection damages (rights of) consumers when they do not want this data to be disclosed. Recently, there was intensive public debate about Facebook privacy settings 8 , judicial decisions such as the Google Case (the right to be forgotten) 9 and Google Glass.
10 These events illustrate that organizations might have insufficient incentives to give customers privacy control. In this situation, the market fails in reaching a socially desirable situation. Hence, DPLs are adopted to correct this market failure and ensure a minimal level of control and protection. DPLs do this by obligating organizations to protect the data of consumers, update consumers about the usage of their data, and allow consumers to alter the user rights of these organizations. • The de facto (actual) enforcement of DPLs by the authorities, the number of security audits, their capacity and budget;
III. The limitations of this study
• Internet usage per capita;
• The number of virus scanners installed;
• The number of data breaches per year;
• … 10 These and many other factors influence real privacy control. Some of them cannot even be observed directly. 12 The impossibility to observe and quantify an exhaustive list of elements that together form de facto privacy control 13 ensures that the focus of this research relies on observable de jure privacy control. Hence, this research does not quantify the legal aspects of DPLs outside the literal text of the law. I also do not consider the sociological and political background of the countries that have adopted DPLs; for instance, governmental access to medical, financial and movement data, data retention and transborder issues. Privacy International analyses and groups these aspects of privacy per country.
14 Within the DPL, six characteristics based on four criteria are selected. This means that this paper omits other characteristics of DPLs -for instance the general requirement for fair and lawful processing of personal data. A long-list of other characteristics of DPLs is displayed in the appendix. A final limitation of this research is that U.S. DPLs are not considered since these laws are very fragmented over certain sectors and States 15 and this paper aims to, amongst others, contribute to the debate about a federal law by gaining insights on the status of DPLs in other parts of the world. For research on (proposed) US DPLs I refer to Barclay.
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12 They can only be measured through the usage of proxies, such as the intensity of metrics that are measurable, such as the amount of deep packet inspection, or surveys among citizens. should be nested within broader ethical frameworks to function correctly. 24 Consequently, similar laws can have different outcomes and different laws can have similar outcomes. In that sense it is hard to commensurate, because something different is measured. One could only make statements such as: "while from a broad perspective privacy control, developed countries have far better privacy control regimes, the legal texts of developing countries are mostly as stringent or more stringent." However, they also argue that there is a large difference between "law on the books" and "law in practice". This paper only takes into account "law on the books".
25 There is much qualitative comparative legal research on DPLs. Hence, this overview only highlights a few examples.
Another problem is time. Information technology is dynamic, and so are the laws governing it. Hence, information security laws, such as DPLs, are increasingly subject to change. Governments are becoming progressively more concerned with online privacy. As a result, studies regarding Internet related legislation become quickly out-dated. 20 out of the 71 laws I analyzed were introduced or had significant amendments in 2012, 2013 or 2014. One study of the United Nations is scientific, quantitative and recent, but focuses on a different subject: cybercrime legislation. 26 According to one of the co-authors, one of the key challenges of quantifying laws is making meaningful categorizations while keeping variety in variables low in order to avoid over-interpretation.
27
In Table 2 below, I scored current studies and their limitations regarding application in this study. 40 This is done in a legal manner: "the comparatists use just the same criteria as any other lawyer"
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41 , but "has more material at his disposal". For instance, the recent study about DPLs by Bamberger and Mulligan 42 utilizes qualitative comparative legal research focusing on data protection. Through this kind of traditional comparative research, DPLs can be understood in detail. There are also drawbacks; usually, a limited amount of jurisdictions can be analyzed because a deep dive in a single jurisdiction requires a lot of time and resources. Moreover, the results are not suitable for statistical analysis. Quantification enables a fast overview of laws. A quantitative analysis of legal texts enables direct comparison of a limited amount of variables between an extensive number of jurisdictions (in the case of this paper: 71). In this way, the potential drawback of qualitative legal analysis -its limited number of jurisdictions -can be mitigated. In a globalized world, a quantitative method allows for enhanced understanding of the similarities and differences between laws.
43 However nuances within laws and legal systems are omitted in quantitative analysis. Thus, qualitative and quantitative legal analyses can complement each other. By using both, we enhance our understanding of the national approaches to address societal problems through the use of the law.
19 Second, quantification of DPLs enables disclosure for statistical analysis. By quantifying the law, existing theories of effective laws can be falsified or supported, which creates a better understanding of the law. Additionally, coding is needed to measure effects of laws on events in the real world. Currently, scholars collect, measure and structure statistics of information security. This includes data breaches, 44 deep packet inspection, 45 details of Internet domain names, 46 malware, 47 and e-service adoption.
48 While on the basis of these studies, researchers are able to draw conclusions concerning statistics of information security, this research does not allow for linking effects with differences within regulations. Currently, much legislation is solely described qualitatively. Regulations are displayed in the form of text in a code, and not as a form of code in an index. For example, a recent study related Deep Packet Inspection intensity with privacy regulation strictness.
49 This study encountered difficulty in finding a decent metric for privacy regulation strictness.
50 In short, researchers in information security desire quantitative disclosure of different legislationcoded data that is constructed in verifiable and repeatable way. Measuring the impact of regulations on society improves the quality of the legal system.
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Coding the law is the first step for a quantitative impact assessment. 22 Another important aspect of privacy control is compliance with this control. I use the theory of regulatory deterrence to discuss this perspective. The deterrence theory is based on the assumption that complying with a regulation is to a large extent a cost benefit analysis. Organizations will comply if the cost of compliance is lower than the cost of noncompliance. If a penalty for non-compliance is very high, an organization will be more willing to comply than if a penalty for non-compliance is very low. 56 If enforcement is stringent and hence the likelihood of detection is high, organizations are also more willing to comply. Scholars argue that higher sanctions lead to more compliance.
II. The perspective of privacy control
57 Some argue that employees of an organization are incentivized by the perceived severity of the sanctions.
58 In addition, DPAs expect fines to be "strongly deterrent". 59 Within the context of this paper, I exclusively look at enforcement mechanisms within the law that increase the likelihood of detection or the height of the penalty. 60 Hence, this paper does not claim a normative standpoint, in the sense that privacy-control should be the best or only aim of DPLs. It takes a neutral descriptive approach. The index gives us a descriptive understanding about those characteristics in the law that contribute to privacy control in DPLs. Moreover, by constructing a privacy control index, it can be falsified or confirmed whether elements of privacy control in the literal text of the law have an impact on desirable policy outcomes. Moreover, the school of behavioral economics disputes the deterrence theory. This academic school questions its rationality in calculating costs and benefits. However, scholars argue that, when actors tend to be more professional, such as large organizations, their behavior will be more rational.
III. The source: DLA Piper data protection handbook 25 I use the literal text of the DPLs as the main source for coding the law. An assessment of the literal text requires knowledge regarding the origins of the laws and local legal language. How do we gather the knowledge we need with limited resources?
60 Schwartz (n 52) explains the autonomy trap by first assessing this as a problem of self-determination. This is caused by two phenomena. The first is that there is a large information asymmetry between the vendor and the consumer. caused by obscure and hard to understand privacy notices (Schwartz, 822). The second is the fact that people do not really have a choice not to account for because than they are excluded for services. Information asymmetry and little choice causes a general inertia toward default terms Moreover, autonomy is limited further through the legitimate use of personal data by the government or other parties. The uses of personal data by third parties also causes the security seclusion problem: people think they have control and information is isolated, but this is not the case. The last problem consists of the commodification of privacy, it can be traded and sold at the lowest price. More about this in the work of Schwartz.
Local legal experts are able to efficiently distract characteristics of the law from the literal text. Global international law firms have such local experts. Therefore, I relied on reports on data protection legislation constructed by international law firms to serve their clients. There are several reports available as displayed in Table 3 below:
26 64 I asked for disclosure for academic purposes but did not get a response from the firm.
variables.
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29 The characteristics are selected on three criteria: first, they need to affect privacy control; second, the characteristics need to be quantifiable, in the sense that they can be coded on a dummy or interval/ratio scale; and third, the characteristics need to be different among countries. If all countries would have the same variable, this variable will not elicit differences between countries. Special attention should be given to the validity of the coding procedure. A limitation of the applied coding procedure is namely the use of a secondary source. Furthermore, the dichotomous or ordinal scale is a concern. For instance, the degree of independence of DPAs varies considerably across countries.
D. The six coded characteristics
30 This research aims to answer the following question:
How do countries outside the US design their data protection laws with respect to key elements such as consent, the presence of data protection authorities, and penalties for non-compliance?
32 In this section, the results of the coded characteristics are discussed, either as a dummy variable or on an ordinal scale. The footnotes highlight choices made in the coding process. 66 Below there is overview of the theoretical effects of characteristics on various elements of privacy control (Table 4) . 68 There are roughly two forms -an information duty and prior consent. An information duty means that individuals have to be informed about when their data is collected and how it is treated.
33
69 Prior consent means that individuals have to give consent before a data processor wants to disclose personal information. 70 An information duty is less severe, since organizations are not dependent on the consent of consumers and consumers might miss this information. 71 In Table 5 below, the results for collection requirements are shown: 36 The data shows that most countries require prior consent. Only a few require solely an information duty. This is not surprising, since prior consent is one of the corner stone principles of many DPLs. Countries that are labelled zero (no requirement) also do not have a law.
35

II. Data breach notification requirement (DBNL)
37 The data breach notification requirement (in the US this is commonly referred to as the Data Breach Notification Law [hereafter, DBNL]) influences both control and safety requirements in privacy control. A notification requirement obliges organizations to notify a data breach to affected customers and a supervisory authority. Schwartz and Janger suggest that this is a constructive measure because the quick awareness of a data breach by consumers has a positive impact on control of data of individuals.
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A notification of a data breach also ensures safety of data. The damage following a breach can be mitigated faster. Moreover, a requirement incentivizes companies to invest in information security.
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Organizations want to avoid a notification because of the perceived (mostly reputational) damage they suffer (c.f. the 'sunlight as a disinfectant' principle). The descriptive statistics for data breach notification requirements across the 71 states analyzed are displayed below (Table 6 ):
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III. Data protection authority (DPA)
40 A data protection authority (DPA) has to enforce compliance with the DPL. 75 A DPA executes security audits and imposes sanctions. DPAs review organizations based on complaints of individuals.
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The actual degree of enforcement differs between countries, and is excluded from this analysis. Apart from enforcement, DPAs are an information and notification center. For instance, organizations should notify a data breach to the DPA according to a DBNL. The presence of a DPA is an indicator of the degree of compliance because a DPA executes parts of DPLs. The presence of a DPL indicates that there are resources for enforcement. Moreover in general, the importance of privacy and data protection is visible for consumers. For instance, DPAs communicate through media channels to educate individuals about who to complain to for (alleged) breaches of data protection. 77 Third, a DPA functions as a point of contact, which eases and urges compliance with DPLs. Without a DPA, enforcement would merely be passive in the sense that probably only non-compliance highlighted in the media would be sanctioned. The descriptive statistics of the presence of data protection authorities are displayed in Table 7 below. 
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IV. Data protection officer (DPO)
43 A data protection officer (DPO) is responsible for safeguarding personal data of individuals. A DPO ought to be appointed by organizations to ensure compliance. 79 Hence, a DPO captures both elements of "safety" and "compliance". A DPO functions as a connection between the literal text of the law and the daily practice of organizations that process personal data. Organizations with DPOs are more likely to incorporate a privacy policy. DPOs aid to establish social norms within this corporate infrastructure.
80
Privacy minded employees induce compliance in the whole organization because of social norms.
81
The descriptive statistics of the presence of a data protection authority are displayed in Table 8 below: 82 Laws that have a general obligation for organizations to appoint DPOs are labelled 1. Some laws only require a DPO 45 17 DPLs require a DPO; this is less than a quarter of the total amount of laws observed. The requirement to appoint a DPO could be an administrative burden for organizations 83 This administrative burden could explain why most countries did not incorporate this requirement.
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V. Monetary sanctions
46 Monetary sanctions aim to increase the cost of noncompliance. Interviewees suggested that managers in organizations are deterred by the maximum damage possibly incurred by non-compliance. Hence, the characteristic "monetary sanction" relates to the maximum sanction that can be imposed. The descriptive statistics of the height of monetary sanctions are shown in Table 9 below:
47 48 Only 5 out of 71 countries have a maximum penalty for non-compliance above 1 million euro. This is the amount that really starts to deter companies when taking into account that the likelihood of detection is low. Hence there are little possibilities to deter. The likelihood of being caught is likely to play a large role in determining the expected sanction. This likelihood is strongly related to the enforcement costs for DPAs, which are high according to scholars, but unobserved in this analysis.
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for designated sectors. This is not a general obligation; hence they are labelled '0'. Other laws reduce data breach notification requirements if a DPO is appointed. Since this is not an obligation to install a DPO, these states are labelled '0'. The same applies with laws that recommend organizations to install a DPO.
83 ibid. 
VI. Criminal sanctions
49 The possibility to impose criminal penalties for noncompliance with the regulation is an additional sanction. Personal accountability increases when persons are subject to criminal sanctions such as imprisonment. Hence, criminal sanctions cause personal responsibility for the actions of corporate employees. The descriptive statistics of the criminalization of non-compliance with DPLs is shown in Table 10 below. Approximately half of the countries I studied criminalize non-compliance with the DPA. 
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II. Basic characteristics and add-ons
55 Two factors have eigenvalues above one.
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Moreover, the scree plot (the diagram displaying the eigenvalues, shown in Appendix E) displays a relatively clear bend between the second and the third suggested factor. The pattern matrix shows clear correlations of each characteristic with one particular underlying factor. The correlation with the individual characteristics are shown in Table 12 below. The privacy control index is the sum of the two factors, "basic characteristics" and "add-ons". Hence, the index does not resemble the top 10 of "best" DPLs but scored high on the presence of the six underlying characteristics (see Table 13 ). high de jure standards indicating that legislators may want to keep up with developed countries. Recent international calls for stringent privacy regimes could explain this. In addition to that, the data protection directive 95/46/EC (that serves as a minimum base for DPLs for all EU Member States) has been adopted in 1995. When the draft general data protection regulation enters into force in the EU in 2018, all 27 Member States will likely occupy the top position again based on the privacy control index. EU countries now have a middle-position in the index. The presence of those countries in the bottom 10 of the index is due to the fact that these countries have very limited or no DPLs. In Figure 3 below, the privacy index is broken down in parts for EU members (1) and non-EU members (0). 
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II. Relation with other indices
62 Table 14 shows correlations of the privacy control index with other indices that were discussed. In a narrow view, the privacy control index resembles the sum of two factors that measure six coded characteristics. The privacy index displays not perfect representation of de jure privacy control and an even less perfect representation of de facto privacy control. As Box said: "all models are wrong, but some are useful".
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The privacy index measures solely the literal text of the law, and within this scope, exclusively six characteristics. Hence, this privacy index does not give an indication on "how good" privacy protection is in a certain country.
94 The aim is adding quantified knowledge to existing qualitative insights about DPLs.
65 Bamberger and Mulligan put it this way: "The law on the books differs from law in practice." Indeed, privacy control is broader than the privacy control index. The degree of privacy control of data protection regimes is also determined by non-legal factors such as, but not limited to, actual imposed penalties, 95 the enforcement capacity of data protection authorities, the number of data breaches, and Internet usage per capita as discussed in Section 1.3. Purpose specification: The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.
G. Conclusions
Not meeting criterion 4. A use limitation is present in all DPLs.
Use limitation: Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with its purpose except: Security safeguards: Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.
We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
Openness: There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identify and usual residence of the data controller Not meeting criterion 3. The concept of openness is hard to quantify.
Individual access:
a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him i) within a reasonable time;
ii) at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
iii) in a reasonable manner; and iv) in a form that is readily intelligible to him; c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial
Individual correction: to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended.
Accountability: A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles of the DPL.
Not meeting criterion 4. In all DPLs, data controllers are accountable.
Requirement of an independent data protection authority as the key element of an enforcement regime Included Requirement of recourse to the courts to enforce data privacy rights Not meeting criterion 4. In all DPLs, one has a recourse to courts. (apart from the countries that do not have a data protection law at all)
Requirement of restrictions on personal data exports to countries which did not have a sufficient standard of privacy protection (defined as 'adequate')
Collection must be the minimum necessary for the purpose of collection, not simply 'limited' We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
A general requirement of 'fair and lawful processing' (not just collection) where a law outside Europe adopts the terminology of 'fair processing' and a structure based on other obligations being instances of fair processing, this is both indicative of influence by the Directive, and makes it easier for the law to be interpreted in a way which is consistent with the Directive;
Not meeting criterion 3. The concept of 'fair and lawful processing' is hard to quantify.
Requirements to notify, and sometimes provide 'prior checking', of particular types of processing systems
Destruction or anonymisation of personal data after a period We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
Additional protections for particular categories of sensitive data We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
Limits on automated decision-making, and a right to know the logic of automated data processing We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
Requirement to provide 'opt-out' of direct marketing uses of personal data We allow for a maximum of six characteristics (criterion 1) for simplicity reasons and hence, this characteristic is excluded.
Monetary sanctions for non-compliance with the DPL Included
